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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-The Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination Applies to Juveniles in CourtOrdered Psychological Evaluations:
State v. Christopher P.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. ChristopherP.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court extended
the United States Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination to
juveniles who are required to submit to a court-ordered psychological
examination to determine their amenability to treatment in the juvenile
justice system. This step reiterates the court's determination to provide
juveniles with the same rights and privileges that adults enjoy while
upholding
the validity of psychological examinations properly limited in
2
scope.

This Note examines Christopher P. in light of United States Supreme
Court decisions on the subject of constitutional rights in juvenile justice
proceedings, analyzes how the holding in Christopher P. comports with
the structure of New Mexico statutory and case law, and examines the
effect that ChristopherP. will have on future New Mexico juvenile justice
proceedings.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 23, 1988, fifteen-year-old Christopher P. was charged
with two counts of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree
murder, and two counts of tampering with evidence in a petition filed
with the children's court.3 On the same day, the children's court attorney
filed a motion to transfer the case to district court pursuant to section
32-1-30 of the New Mexico Children's Code. 4 Pursuant to the statute,
the trial court judge split the transfer proceedings into two parts. In the
first, the judge found that it was reasonable to believe that Christopher
committed the alleged acts. In the second, the trial judge considered
Christopher's amenability to treatment as a child.'
As part of the amenability consideration, the judge ordered Christopher,
over his counsel's objection, to submit to a psychological evaluation in
which he was also ordered to discuss the specific acts with which he was

1. 112 N.M. 416, 816 P.2d 485 (1991).
2. See id.
3. State v. Christopher P., III N.M. 80, 82, 801 P.2d 662, 664 (Ct. App. 1990).
4. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-30
(Repl. Pamp. 1989) (discretionary transfer to district court) with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-29(A)
(Repl. Pamp. 1989) (transfer provision requiring the trial judge to make specific findings prior to
a transfer).
5. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486.
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charged.6 In the evaluation, Christopher discussed the acts with which
he was charged and his feelings about them. His counsel and the children's
court attorney both watched the evaluation through a one-way mirror.
The psychologist relied, at least in part, on Christopher's discussion of
that Christopher was not amenable
the alleged acts in his determination
7
to treatment as a child.
The transfer motion was granted and Christopher immediately appealed,
claiming, among other things, that his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination 8 was violated by the court's order to discuss the alleged
crimes in the psychological evaluation. 9 The court of appeals rejected
Christopher's appeal and affirmed the transfer order. 0 The New Mexico
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals,
finding that Christopher's Fifth Amendment Tights were violated by the
trial court's order to discuss the alleged crimes with the psychologist.'
III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

United States Supreme Court Precedent
Four United States Supreme Court decisions provide the framework
for considering the application of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
privilege to court-ordered psychological examinations used to determine
amenability in juvenile transfer proceedings. Estelle v. Smith 2 examined
whether inculpatory statements made by an adult criminal defendant in
a court-ordered psychological examination to determine competency to
stand trial could be introduced in the subsequent sentencing proceeding.'
The Court held that, even though the statements were not being introduced
in the guilt-determination phase of the judicial proceeding, "[gliven the
gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not
relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guar4
antees."'
The issue of whether constitutional standards apply to juvenile transfer
proceedings in general was answered in the affirmative by the Supreme
Court in Kent v. United States.'5 The Kent court held that, despite the
informal nature of many juvenile court proceedings, those proceedings
"must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."'' 6

A.

6. Id. The judge ordered that the psychologist's testimony "could be used only for the amenability
portion of the transfer hearing and for no other purpose." Id.
7. Id.
8. The Fifth Amendment of United States Constitutional was made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
9. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486.
10. State v. Christopher P., 111 N.M. 80, 81, 801 P.2d 662, 663 (Ct. App. 1990).
11. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486.
12. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
13. Id. at 468.
14. Id. at 463.
15. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
16. Id. at 562.
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The only specific constitutional right held applicable to transfer proceedings in Kent was the right to the assistance of counsel.' 7 Nevertheless,
to stress the critical importance of the juvenile
the Court took pains
8
transfer proceeding.'
One year later, in In re Gault,19 the Supreme Court again considered
the issue of the application of constitutional protections to juveniles. The
Gault court held that "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is as applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to
adults. "20 Although the Gault holding deals specifically with self-incrimination, it does not squarely answer the question presented in Christopher
P., for the Gault court was addressing the delinquency determination
stage of the juvenile proceeding, as2 opposed to the amenability determination in the transfer proceeding. '
Finally, in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 22 the United States Supreme Court
stated conclusively that:
[t]he [Fifth] Amendment not only protects the individual against being
involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put
to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedwhere
ings.2 3
New Mexico Statutory Provisions
The Children's Code of New Mexico2 has as its stated purpose, among
other objectives, "[t]o provide judicial and other procedures through
which the provisions of the Children's Code are executed and enforced
and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional
and other legal rights are recognized and enforced."' 2' In addition, the
Code specifically states that children being subjected to the juvenile justice
system are "entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except as
otherwise provided in the Children's Code." 26

B.

17. Id. at 557.
18. Id. at 556.
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

20. Id.at 55.
21. See generally id. In New Mexico, the transfer proceeding precedes any adjudicatory hearing

of the merits on a petition alleging a delinquent act. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-29 to -30 (Repl.
Pamp. 1989). The Gault Court specified, however, that it is "clear that the availability of the [selfincrimination] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked,
but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites." Gault, 387
U.S. at 49.
22. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
23. Id. at 77 (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)). The Gault Court quoted
similar language from Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964). Gault, 387 U.S.
at 47-48.
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-1 to -59 (Repl. Pamp. 1989, Cum. Supp. 1992).
25. Id. § 32-1-2(E) (emphasis added).
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989). In addition, section 32-1-27 provides in
subsections (C), (E), and (F) significant specific extensions of constitutional provisions to juveniles,
including the right to be informed of their constitutional rights, id. at (C), the right not to have
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Two sections of the Children's Code provide for transfer of a juvenile
to district court: sections 32-1-29 and 32-1-30. For purposes of this Note,

the main difference between the two sections is that in section 32-1-29,
the judge must find that "the child is not amenable to treatment or
rehabilitation as a child through available facilities.' '27 If transfer is sought
under section 32-1-30, however, the judge must merely consider the child's2
amenability to treatment, not make a conclusive finding on that issue. 1
The transfer in Christopher P. was sought pursuant to section 32-1-30,
the discretionary transfer provision .29
C.

New Mexico Precedent
The New Mexico Court of Appeals succinctly stated the breadth of
Fifth Amendment protections in New Mexico by stating that "[the Fifth
Amendment] privileges a defendant not to answer questions put to him

in any proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might tend to incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. "30 On the
other hand, "[als a practical matter, if [self-incriminatory statements can]
not be used to convict, then they [are] not self-incriminatory. If they

[are] not self-incriminatory, then there [is] no Fifth Amendment privilege
32
to be asserted."'" Similarly, the court of appeals in State v. Romero
stated that "[tjhe privilege against self-incrimination does not turn upon
the type of proceeding, but the exposure involved." 3

New Mexico has previously considered whether a children's court judge
may order a psychological examination for the purposes of determining
amenability. In State v. Doe,3 4 the court held that since no inculpatory

statements were involved, the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were

any of their statements used against them unless a waiver is made, id. at (C) and (E), and the
right not to have any "confessions, statements or admissions ... introduced against [children]
under the age of fifteen years prior to an adjudication on the allegations of the petition," id. at
(F).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-29(A)(4)(b) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
28. Id. § 32-1-30(A)(4); see also State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 674 P.2d 1109 (1983).
29. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486.
30. Rainbow Baking Company of Albuquerque, Inc. v. Apodaca, 88 N.M. 501, 504, 542 P.2d
1191, 1194 (Ct. App. 1975). The Rainbow Baking court was concerned with whether a defendant
in a civil proceeding could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
anticipation of his statements being used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. at
504, 542 P.2d at 1194.
31. State v. Urioste, 95 N.M. 712, 715, 625 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Ct. App. 1980). The Urioste court
held that even though the defendant's self-incriminating statements made during the trial of a codefendant could not be used against the defendant in subsequent state court proceedings, they might
be used in a federal determination of the defendant as a habitual offender. Thus, the privilege was
properly invoked. Id. at 715, 625 P.2d at 1232.
32. 96 N.M. 795, 635 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1981). The Romero court held that immunity from
use of compelled testimony could be ordered pursuant to N.M. R. EVID. 412, N.M. R. CmM. P.
58, or N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-3A-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) and that defendants could thus be required
to testify in a children's court proceeding. Romero, 96 N.M. at 796-97, 635 P.2d at 999-1000. The
Romero court was careful to point out that the defendants' testimony "could not be used against
them directly or indirectly," and that "the compelled testimony could not be used against them in
any respect." Id. at 797, 635 P.2d at 1000.
33. Romero, 96 N.M. at 797, 635 P.2d at 1000.
34. 97 N.M. 263, 639 P.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1981).

Spring 1993]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

not implicated. 5 Under Doe, a juvenile may be ordered to submit to 3a6
psychological examination for the purposes of determining amenability.
D. Sister Jurisdictions' Case Law Background
Other jurisdictions are in harmony with New Mexico in allowing courtordered psychological examinations of juveniles pursuant to amenability
determinations. 37 In none of these authorities, however, was the issue of
a court-ordered discussion of the alleged delinquent acts in the examination
raised. Only one case, R.H. v. State of Alaska,38 has squarely addressed
the question of inculpatory statements in a court-ordered psychological
examination for the purposes of assessing amenability in transfer proceedings.
The R.H. decision relied heavily on Estelle v. Smith. Noting the
adversarial nature of waiver (transfer) proceedings and the significantly
larger sentences that the juvenile would be exposed to if transferred to
district court, the R.H. court held that no psychological examination
could be compelled in a waiver (transfer) proceeding. 9 The R.H. court
so held despite the fact that the trial judge went to extreme lengths to
ensure that any inculpatory statements would not be forced out of the
child and, if they were, they would be inadmissible at any other phase
of the child's judicial proceedings. 40
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE CHRISTOPHER P. COURT

The Christopher P. court's analysis began by examining the relevant
New Mexico statutes dealing with the extension of constitutional rights

35. Id. at 266, 639 P.2d at 75. The Doe court distinguished the facts in the case before it from
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), by stressing that no inculpatory statements were at issue in
Doe. Doe, 97 N.M. at 266, 639 P.2d at 75. Estelle held that inculpatory statements made in a
court-ordered psychological examination for the purposes of assessing competency to stand trial
could not be introduced in the subsequent sentencing proceeding. Estelle, 451 U.S. So. 2d at 468.
36. Doe, 97 N.M. at 265, 639 P.2d at 74.
37. Lippold v. State, 365 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), writ denied, 365 So. 2d 1022
(1979); Matter of Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile Action No. J-77027-1, 679 P.2d 92 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1984); State in Interest of Bruno, 388 So. 2d 784 (La. 1980); Commonwealth v. Dotson, 429
A.2d 682 (Pa. 1981).
38. 777 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
39. Id. at 211.
40. The R.H. court stated:
[Trial] Judge Hodges took elaborate precautions to safeguard R.H.'s privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to counsel. The judge directed that R.H.'s attorney
have the right to be present with R.H. during the examinations . . . that R.H.'s
examiners be precluded from discussing their findings with the state, and he directed
that their written reports be submitted to the court under seal for an initial screening
by R.H.'s counsel. R.H.'s counsel was to be given an opportunity to raise selfincrimination objections to any specific information in the reports dealing with the
facts of the case. Defense objections were to be ruled upon by a judge other than
No further use of the report,
the judge presiding over the waiver hearings ....
beyond the waiver stage, was to be allowed.
Id. at 207. Also see Christopher P., in which the only precaution against self-incrimination was
the trial judge's order that the psychologist's testimony would not be admissible at any other phase
of Christopher's judicial proceedings. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486.
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to children's court proceedings. 4 ' Thereafter, in its first substantive passage, the court made it clear that it considers transfer proceedings a
critical part of the juvenile defendant's exposure to the juvenile justice
system, thereby signaling the ultimate holding that Fifth Amendment
privileges against self-incrimination are applicable to transfer proceedings.4 2 Citing Gault and Kent, the supreme court made the generalized
observation that the transfer proceeding is extremely important to the
juvenile and has significant consequences for him. 43 From this finding,
the application of the Gault provision that "the availability of the privilege
does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is
invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the
exposure which it invites" logically follows. 44
The supreme court was careful to distinguish the type of psychological
evaluation in Christopher P., in which the defendant was ordered to
discuss the crimes with which he was charged, from a permissible courtordered psychological evaluation, in which the defendant is not compelled
to make inculpatory statements.4 1 In its examination of other jurisdictions'
case law on the subject, the court was quick to point out that all other
jurisdictions which allow court-ordered psychological evaluations for the
purposes of amenability determinations in transfer proceedings have not
considered the question regarding self-incrimination as presented in Christopher P.46 The court did, however, take notice of R.H. v. State,47 in
which the Alaska Court of Appeals held that psychological evaluations
may not be ordered by the court because of the possibility of self4
incrimination.
Finally, the supreme court distinguished the evaluation ordered in
Christopher P. from that allowed in State v. Doe by stressing the fact
that the child in Christopher P. was forced to make self-incriminatory
statements.4 9 Because a transfer proceeding has such dire consequences
for the juvenile, the court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination does apply to those proceedings.50 Even in its holding,

41. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 418, 816 P.2d at 487. The court discussed N.M. STAT. ANN.
(D) and (E) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (subsections which stress the protective nature of
Children's Code purpose) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) (extending to
children the same basic privileges guaranteed adults).
42. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486.
43. Id. at 418, 816 P.2d at 487. Additionally, the court cited Martin Forst & Martha-Elin
Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 323, 339 (1989). Id.
44. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 417, 816 P.2d at 486.
45. Id. at 419, 816 P.2d at 488.
46. Id. at 418; 816 P.2d at 487. The court discussed Lippold v. State, 365 So. 2d 1015 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1978), writ denied, 365 So. 2d 1022 (1979), Matter of Appeal in Pima County, Juvenile
Action No. J-77027-1, 679 P.2d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), State in Interest of Bruno, 388 So. 2d
784 (La. 1980), and Commonwealth v. Dotson, 429 A.2d 682 (Pa. 1981).
47. 777 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); see also infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
48. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 418, 816 P.2d at 487.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 419-20, 816 P.2d at 488-90.

§ 32-1-2(B),
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however, the court explicitly stated that "[wie do not suggest the privilege
excludes a court ordered evaluation properly limited in scope."',
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

By focusing on the extreme importance of the transfer proceedings to
the juvenile, the ChristopherP. court is certainly in line with the United
States Supreme Court's view of those proceedings as discussed in Kent
v. United States.5 2 This characterization of transfer proceedings allows
53
the court to surmount the barrier erected by State v. Urioste, which
stated that if a statement could4 not be used to convict; it could not be
characterized as incriminatory.1
The supreme court's survey of the approaches taken in other jurisdictions regarding the problem of self-incrimination in transfer proceedings
is, however, incomplete. The court failed to recognize Ex Parte Whisenant," in which the Alabama Supreme Court issued a holding remarkably
similar to that at which the court in ChristopherP. arrived. Consequently,
the court deprived itself of a potent buttressing precedent from a sister
jurisdiction. The Whisenant majority, in a very succinct opinion, held
that because the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
such a fundamental privilege, it could not be undermined by allowing
56
self-incriminatory statements to be introduced in transfer proceedings.
While the Whisenant case dealt with the probable cause portion of a
transfer proceeding and did not involve a psychological evaluation, the
discussion of self-incriminatory statements and the fundamental nature
self-incrimination is particularly applicable to the
of the privilege against
57
Christopher P. case.
Similarly, by failing to take note of several cases which have holdings
contrary to the one in Christopher P., the supreme court failed to take
advantage of an opportunity to distinguish those contrary cases." Distinguishing these cases would have been an easy task, for none addressed
the importance of the transfer proceeding59 to the child or the consequences
that result from a decision to transfer.

51. Id. at 420, 816 P.2d at 489. Presumably, the court was preempting claims that the Christopher
P. decision overruled Doe, which allowed court-ordered psychological evaluations in transfer proceedings.
52. 383 U.S. 541 (1966); see also supra notes 15 through 17 and accompanying text.
53. 95 N.M. 712, 625 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1980).
54. Id. at 715, 625 P.2d at 1232.
55. 466 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. 1985).
56. Id. at 1008.
57. Id.
58. In re G.B.K., 376 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), In re C.J.P., 650 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983), and State v. Holland, 635 P.2d 142 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) all have fact patterns
remarkably similar to the one in Christopher P., but all hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is not available to defendants in court-ordered psychological evaluations
in juvenile transfer proceedings.
59. See In re G.B.K., 376 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); In re C.J.P., 650 S.W.2d 465
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Holland, 635 P.2d 142 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
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Also, the court never mentioned the New Mexico Constitution's privilege
against self-incrimination. 6° The door was open for the court to emphasize
New Mexico's sovereignty and to ensure the decision against reversal by
States Supreme Court, but the court failed to discuss the
the United
1
issue.

6

The impact of Christopher P. is bound to be limited by the nature
of the issue. New Mexico courts had already decided in Doe that courtordered psychological evaluations for the purposes of determining amenability in transfer proceedings are permissible. 62 ChristopherP. limits the
scope of those hearings so as to allow the child to refuse to answer
questions which call for self-incriminatory answers. The court of appeals
considered the question of the effectiveness of a psychological evaluation
to determine amenability to treatment for an offense when the child is
not allowed to discuss the offense with the psychologist. 63 The New
Mexico Supreme Court's decision to allow the child to refuse to discuss
the crime with which he is charged may be a drawback of the Christopher
P. holding.6 Despite the aim of the Children's Code "to provide appropriate and distinct dispositional options for treatment and rehabilitation, ' 65 a judge presiding over a transfer proceeding will no longer be
allowed to consider the child's feelings about the crime with which he
is charged in determining how amenable the child is to treatment within
the juvenile justice system for that crime.
The Christopher P. court's emphasis is upon protecting the constitutional rights of the child. Although how the child feels about the crime
with which he is charged may be important to a psychologist's evaluation
of the amenability to treatment of the child, that consideration takes a
back seat to the self-incrimination privilege in Christopher P. The court
gives no guidance as to how future psychological examinations for the
purposes of determining amenability should be administered in order to
avoid self-incrimination problems.
Although the Alaska courts in R.H. v. State struck down any courtordered psychological evaluation for the purposes of determining amenability,6 the elaborate precautions that the Alaska trial court took might
be instructive to a New Mexico Children's Court judge ordering a postChristopherP. psychological evaluation. 67 Specifically, a post-Christopher
P. court ordering a psychological evaluation should certainly instruct the

60. N.M. CO1ST. art. II, § 15 ("No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a
criminal proceeding ....1").
61. While beyond the scope of this note, the expansion of individual rights through the New
Mexico State Constitution is an interesting topic. The court's failure to discuss this issue leaves
open the question of whether the New Mexico Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination is
merely a restatement of the Federal Constitution's, or if the state constitution's privilege is a broader
or leaner one than the federal.
62. See generally Doe, 97 N.M. 263, 639 P.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1981).
63. State v. Christopher P., 111 N.M. 80, 82, 801 P.2d 662, 664 (Ct. App. 1990).
64. See generally Doe, 97 N.M. 263, 639 P.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1981).
65. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-2(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
66. 777 P.2d 204, 205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
67. See supra note 40.
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evaluator to limit the evaluation so as not to touch upon any matters
for which the child is before the court. Beyond such an instruction, a
court might order that the child's attorney be present during an evaluation,
and that the attorney be allowed to raise self-incrimination objections at
the hearing or upon a review of a report from the evaluator. 68
An interesting point to consider is that the issue discussed in Christopher
P. may be eclipsed by a revision of the Children's Code. Currently, a
proposed revision to the code calls for the elimination of the current
transfer provisions. 69 In their place, a system is proposed in which no
child would be subjected to adult court proceedings unless she is sixteen
or seventeen years old at the time of the offense and is indicted for
first-degree murder. 70 Such a child would be termed a "serious youthful
offender" and would automatically be tried in adult court. 71 The proposed
changes provide for two additional categories of delinquent children,
"youthful offenders" and "delinquent offenders.' '72
Furthermore, considerations of whether the child is amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system, as well as other factors contained
in the current transfer provisions, are contained the decision of which
73
sanctions to levy against a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent. If
the proposed revision is enacted, the ChristopherP. holding would probably apply to the amenability determination in the sentencing phase
because the application of adult or child sanctions is as of equal importance
to the child as whether she will be tried in juvenile or adult
74
court.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The ChristopherP. decision reiterated the New Mexico Supreme Court's
commitment to providing children involved in the juvenile justice system
the same rights and privileges afforded to adults. The holding is in

68. These precautions were all followed by the trial judge in R.H. See supra note 40.
69. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2-1 to -31 (Tentative Draft Oct. 22, 1992).
70. Id. § 32-2-3(J).
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § [Serious Youthful Offenders in Adult Sentencing Provisions]
(Tentative Draft, November 16, 1992). If found guilty of a lesser offense, her punishment may be
that of either a child or adult. Id. at § (G). If convicted of first degree murder, the child
is sentenced as an adult but the court is not required to impose a mandatory sentence. Id. at §.
(F).
72. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-2-3(C), (J) (Tentative Draft November 16, 1992). The distinction
between the two categories is that youthful offenders are those children who would be subject to
transfer under existing provisions, while delinquent offenders are all other juveniles charged under
the Children's Code. Id. Delinquent offenders will be subject only to juvenile sanctions. Id. § 322-19. Youthful offenders may have adult or juvenile sanctions levied upon them, in the discretion
of the trial judge. Id. § 32-2-20.
73. Id. § 32-2-20(C). Under the proposed revision, the judge is required to make an amenability
determination based on factors set forth in the appendix of the Kent opinion. Id.
74. Christopher P., 112 N.M. at 418, 816 P.2d at 487 (discussing the importance to the child
of being subjected to adult criminal sanctions). The importance of observing defendants' constitutional
rights in sentencing proceedings was discussed in Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463. The defendant in Estelle
was subject to capital punishment, but the Court held later that the Estelle holding applied to noncapital punishment cases. See generally Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987).

314
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agreement with the trend of United States Supreme Court cases on the
subject and does not contradict holdings from other jurisdictions. Juveniles
involved in post-ChristopherP. transfer proceedings can be assured that
their privilege against self-incrimination will be protected in all aspects
of that proceeding. Finally, the holding in Christopher P. will continue
to have substantial importance to juveniles accused of a crime in proceedings under the current New Mexico Children's Code and any revisions
currently being considered.
PAUL R. OWEN

